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GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT:
LEONARD PELTIER AND
THE SUBLEGAL SYSTEM
You are about to perform an act which will close one mare chapter
in the history of the failure of the United States to do justice in the
case of a Native American. After centuries of murder . . . could I
have been wise in thinking that you would break that tradition
and commit an act of justice?'
At 11:00 a.m. on June 26, 1975, FBI Special Agents Jack Coler and
Ronald Williams entered the Jumping Bull compound in Oglala, a
traditional Native American community on the Pine Ridge reservation
in South Dakota. 2
 Coler and Williams were in search of an Indian
wanted on charges of assault and thefts Within the next hour, a
shoot-out occurred in which both Coler and Williams were killed.' The
ensuing investigation—termed the "Res Murs" investigation—raised
several questions about the propriety of the government's conduct.'
The Res Murs investigation resulted in an array of civil and criminal
prosecutions, charges of government misconduct, claims of FBI har-
assment of witnesses, and allegations of an FBI frame-up through the
manipulation and withholding of evidence.' The end result of the Res
/ PETER MierrinEsse.N, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE 361 (1991) (quoting Leonard Peltier
addressing the trial court during his sentencing). Peter Matthiessen is a founder of the Paris
Review, author of several works of fiction including At Play in the Fields rf the Lord (National Book
Award nominee), and has authored widely acclaimed works of nonfiction, including: The Snow
Leopard (National Book Award recipient); The Cloud Forest and Under the Mountain Wall (which
together received an Award of Merit from the National Institute of Arts and Letters); and The
Tree. Where Man Was. Born (National Book Award nominee). Id. at iii. Much of die factual account
of the Pine Ridge shoot-out in this Note is derived from Matthiesscn's narrative based on
interviews with the survivors.
2
 United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Peltier I]
3 Peltier I, 585 F.2d at 318; MATVIIIESSEN, supra note 1, at 154.
4
 Peltier 1, 585 F.2d at 318-19. Joe Killsright, a Native American, was also killed at the
shoot-out. MAVEHIESSEN, supra note 1. at 159-60.
See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 800 F.2d 772, 774 (8th Cir, 1986) (appeal of Leonard Pettier
due to concealment of evidence by FBI) [hereinafter Peltier III]; MATT1HESSEN, supra note 1, at
279-315 (accounts of FBI harassment of witnesses). "Res Murs" is short for reservation murders.
MA'ITHIESSEN, supra, note 1, at 193.
6
 See Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 774 (appeal of Leonard Peltier seeking new trial for concealment
and manipulation of material evidence by FBI); Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 676 F. Stipp. 1051
(I). Minn. 1988), ard, 881 F.2d 1426 (8111 Cir. 1989) (civil suit for libel and slander by FBI agent
against Viking Press and author Peter Matthiessen or account of Peltier saga); MATTWESSEN,
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Murs investigation was the trial and conviction of Native American
activist Leonard Peltier for the murders of agents Coler and Williams.'
Leonard Peltier has spent more than fifteen years in prison.' His
case has received considerable attention from the press, human rights
organizations' and even Hollywood.'° Peltier's notoriety stems from
perceptions that he was a victim of the political process and, thus, not
afforded a fair trial." Peltier has continually maintained his innocence
and has tried repeatedly to appeal his conviction.v 2
 He has sought a
new trial on several occasions on grounds that the FBI withheld mate-
rial exculpatory evidence during trial, and that the trial court denied
him compulsory process by refusing to allow evidence supporting his
defense of an FBI frame-up."
This Note critically examines the prosecution of Leonard Peltier
and analyzes the evolution and faults of the requirements for the
supra note 1, at 561 (civil suit for libel by former South Dakota Governor William Janklow against
publisher of Matthiessen's account of the Res Murs investigation); id. at 279-315 (account of
unpublished trial of other "Res Murs" suspects where harassment of witnesses by FBI proven).
7 Peltier I, 585 F.2d at 335.
8 See MATTlintssEN, supra note 1, at 591.
9 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. USA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
AMERICAN INDIANS 29 (1992). Amnesty International sent observers to Peltier's trial and sub-
sequent appeals, Id, Amnesty International has repeatedly expressed its concern about certain
irregularities in the proceedings that led to Leonard Peltier's conviction. AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL USA, THE AMERICAS: HUMAN RIGHTS VioiATioNs AGAINST INDIGENous PEopLES 85
(1992). The organization believes that Peltier may have been aggressively prosecuted on criminal
charges by the FBI because of his role in the American Indian Movement and that his extradition
to the USA from Canada in 1976 to stand trial was granted on evidence that the FBI later admitted
it had fabricated. Id.
i° Two movies were released over the past two years depicting the Res Murs situation and
subsequent investigation. See THUNDERHEART (Columbia-Tristar 1992); INCIDENT AT OGLALA
(Carlco International 1991). Additionally, film-maker Oliver Stone has indicated that he intends
to produce a film on Peltier in the near future. Joseph Farah, Oliver Stone: Far From the Malibu
Crowd, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at M5.
11 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. USA, THE AMERICAS, supra note 9, at 84-85. Leonard I'eltier
is recognized as the most important political prisoner in the United States by both Amnesty
International and Human Rights for Political Prisoners. Antihero, SPIN MAG., Feb., 1991, at 62.
Several years ago, over 21 million Soviets, who consider Peltier a political prisoner, signed a
petition on his behalf. Joan M. Cheever, Conviction or Convenience, NAT'I, LJ., June 25, 1990, at
28. In addition, reports indicate that former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev once asked
President Ronald Reagan to pardon Peltier. Id.
12 See Peltier 111, 800 F.2d 772, 772-74 (8th Cir. 1986). Peltier has always denied killing agents
Coler and Williams. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, THE AMERICAS, supra note 9, at 86.
13 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 773 (appeal due to additional concealed evidence); United States v.
Peltier, 731 F.2d 550, 551 (8th Cir. 1984) (hereinafter Peltier II) (appeal due to concealed
evidence); Peltier I, 585 F.2d 314, 320 (8th Cir. 1978) (appeal over trial court's refusal to admit
evidence of FBI frame-up).
Peltier recently filed another motion for a new trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988),
arguing that, due to concessions made by the government during the appellate proceedings, as
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granting of a new trial." Through a thorough examination of Peltier's
situation, this Note illuminates the existence and fundamental injustice
of a sublegal system in which criminal defendants are functionally
guilty until proven innocent.'' Section 1 describes the circumstances
surrounding the murders on the Pine Ridge reservation, as docu-
mented primarily by author Peter Matthiessen, and reviews the trial
and first appeal of Leonard Peltier.° Section II examines the evolution
of the standards for a new trial in situations where the prosecution has
withheld evidence.' 7 Section III discusses Peltier's discovery of evidence
that was concealed at his original trial and examines his subsequent
appeals.' 8 Section IV analyzes the importance of the standards for a
new trial to Peltier's case and demonstrates that the current standards
were misapplied in his appeal. hi Using Peltier as an example, Section
V illustrates the existence and injustice of a sublegal system in which
criminal defendants are guilty until proven innocent22" This section
concludes that, in order to avoid the injustice of the sublegal system
and ensure a defendant's constitutional right to due process, the stand-
ards for a new trial need to be lessened in situations where critical
evidence was withheld at tria1. 2 '
I. THE RESERVATION MURDERS ON PINE RIDGE
The murders of FBI agents Coler and Williams were, on a small
scale, the culmination of a struggle between the Pine Ridge tribal
government and the reservation's residents. 22 On a larger scale, the
murders and the subsequent prosecution of Leonard Peltier have been
described in this Note, the record no longer supported his conviction, Peltier v. Heitman, No.
92-1129, 1993 WL 241915, at *4 (8th Cir. 1993). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held, however, that the government had not conceded the basis on which Peltier's
conviction rested. Id. In dicta, the court also asserted that, because lie was also charged with
aiding and abetting, he would have been found guilty of this by the jury despite any concessions
made by the government. hi. The appropriateness of an appellate court making such findings of
fact is beyond the scope of this Note.
14 See infra notes 22-273 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 22-273 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 22-117 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 118-72 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 173-215 and accompanying text. Appeals not based on the withholding or
evidence are not examined in this Note. See supra note 13 for a discussion of other proceedings
in the Peltier case,
19 See infra notes 216-53 and accompanying text.
21 ' See infra notes 254-72 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
22 See Peltier I, 585 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1978); MArrinEssm, supra note 1, at 59-64;
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, THE. AMERICAS, Supra note 9, at 86.
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viewed as a continuation of the age-old struggle between Native Ameri-
cans and the United States government." Regardless of the underlying
rationale for the shoot-out, the Res Murs investigation and the prose-
cution of Peltier and several other suspects is fraught with controversy
over the propriety of the government's conduct."
A. The American Indian Movement and
Their Presence on the Pine Ridge Reservation
The American Indian Movement ("AIM"), founded in 1968, was
an organization dedicated to increasing awareness about, and enforc-
ing the rights of, Native Americans. 25 Author Peter Matthiessen de-
scribes AIM as the culmination of a growing consensus among Native
Americans that government supervision was destroying the Indian
people, and that Native Americans had to resolve their own problems
if they were to survive." In the late 1960s and early 1970s, AIM was
active in seeking the enforcement of treaties between the United States
and Indian peoples. 27
 AIM sought to educate and elicit the support of
the public by staging demonstrations, such as their occupation of
Wounded Knee, the site of an Indian massacre by American troops in
1890.28
 AIM was also very active within Indian communities, providing
legal advice and educating young Indians about their history and
heritage." Due to these activities, AIM received assistance and approval
from community action groups, church groups and other foundations
nationwide." Matthiessen contends that AIM's political activities, how-
23 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. USA, THE AMERICAS, Supra note 9, at 84-86. Recent analysis
by Amnesty International suggests that a covert war over the Pine Ridge Reservation was waged
by the federal government at the time of the shoot-out. See id. at 86. The basis for this belief
stems from the fact that the reservation is rich in uranium deposits, which the federal government
and United States corporations were interested in procuring. Id.
24 See Peltier III, 800 F.2d 772, 775-780 (8th Cir. 1986); MArritiFssENI, supra note I, at
279-315.
25 See MATTHIESSEN, supra note 1, at 34-36.
28
	 at M.
27 See id. at 37-41. AIM specifically sought to enforce Indian fishing rights in Washington,
Oregon and Idaho, to receive abandoned federal lands such as Alcatraz Island, and to enforce
neglected treaties which reserved lands for Native Americans, such as the Mount Rushmore area
of the Black Hills. Id.
28 Id. at 65. Wounded Knee was the site of a violent massacre of unarmed Sioux Indians,
including many women and children, by the soldiers of the Seventh Cavalry in 1890. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STIPra note 9, at 28 n.22.
29 Micrruesstlx, supra note 1, at 36. AIM set up Survival Schools, which were an alternative
to reform schools. Id. Young Indians enrolled in these "Survival Schools" to learn how to adjust
to life in white society without losing their own culture. Id.
Id.
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ever, were not well received by the FBI, who labeled AIM an extremist
group and placed AIM's leaders at the top of its list of key extremists. 3 '
At the time of the murders of the two FBI agents, the Pine Ridge
reservation was in a state of turmoil. 32
 The reservation, under the
control of Richard Wilson, head of the Tribal Council, was the scene
of much violence." Strongly opposed to AIM, its focus on traditional
Indian culture and its influence on the people of Pine Ridge, Wilson
outfitted and armed a private police force to keep the residents sub-
dued. 34
 This armed unit came to be known on the reservation as the
"Goon Squad," clue to the brutality of its repression of the indigenous
peoples." The residents of Pine Ridge requested the presence of AIM
members on the reservation, to protect them from the violence of
Wilson's Goon Squad." Complying with their wishes, several AIM mem-
bers, including Leonard Peltier, Dean Butler and Bob Robideau, set
up a "tent city" on the Jumping Bull compound, in Oglala, a more
traditionally oriented section of the Pine Ridge reservation. 37
 From the
spring of 1975 until the fatal shoot-out in June of the same year, the
AIM members remained on the reservation in an attempt to alleviate
the conflict between Wilson and the Pine Ridge residents."
B. The Pine Ridge Shoot
-Out
On June 26, 1975, Special Agents Coler and Williams, entered the
Jumping Bull compound in search ofJimmy Eagle, a nineteen-year-old
Indian wanted on assault and theft charges." The agents followed a
vehicle onto the Jumping Bull compound in the hopes of apprehend-
ing Eagle." Transcripts of radio transmissions between Coler and Wil-
liams indicate that they perceived that the occupants of the other
31 Id. at 55-56.
32 See id. at 59-64.
33 See id. at 131-32. During . March of 1975, seven people, Iwo of them children, were killed
in gunfights. Id. Others were killed by snipers, drive-by shootings and arson. Id. Between 1973
and 1975, more than 60 Indians were killed and hundreds more assaulted and harassed, allegedly
by Wilson's paramilitary squad. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
supra note 9, at 28. During this period, the FBI fitiled to obtain a single conviction fur the murders
of AIM activists, and according to Amnesty International, complaints of assault and harassment
went uninvestigated. Id.
MATTH IESS EN, Supra note 1, at 60-41.
35 Id.
sn ld. at 65.
37 See id. at 146-48.
38 Peltier I, 585 F.2d 314,318 (8th Cir. 1978).
39 Id.; MAT11-111,SSEN, supra note 1, at 154.
45 Peltiex I, 585 F.2d at 318. An inliirmant had tipped the agents that Eagle might be riding
in a similar vehicle. Id. at 318 n.2.
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vehicle were about to fire on them.' [ There is no record of what
happened next, but a violent shoot-out ensued. 42
According to Matthiessen, the AIM members in the tent city heard
an exchange of gun shots, grabbed their weapons and proceeded to
the scene of the disturbance." Both Coler and Williams, taking heavy
fire, were wounded from a distance, but not fatally." Some time later,
Coler and Williams were shot and killed by a small caliber weapon fired
at point-blank range."
Within forty minutes of the first shots, the Jumping Bull com-
pound was completely surrounded by FBI agents, Bureau of Indian
Affairs ("BIA") police, FBI and BIA SWAT teams, state police officers
and members of the Goon Squad." Matthiessen has concluded, given
the hostility toward AIM, especially in the Pine Ridge area, the Indians
probably feared that, whether or not the agents had survived the
shoot-out, anyone involved would be shot on sight, even if they surren-
dered.47 Thus, the residents of the tent city, including AIM members,
women and children, dispersed and fled the area." All were successful
in escaping the various roadblocks and search parties."
C. The FBI's Investigation of the Pine Ridge Shoot -Out
Matthiessen maintains that the FBI attached great importance to
its investigation of the murders of agents Coler and Williams. 5° The
FBI initiated an extensive investigation, but the means it employed in
locating and apprehending suspects have received much criticism. 51
The results of the FBI investigation revealed that the agents were killed
41 Id. at 318. There is no evidence indicating that the agents attempted to identify themselves.
See id.; see also MNITHMSSEN, supra note 1, at 155-56.
42 Peltier I, 585 F.2d at 318.
49 MArri-tiEssEN, supra note 1, at 155-56.
44 Peltier I, 585 F.2d at 318. Cuter was wounded by a bullet that flew through the trunk of his
car, mutilating his right arm, and Williams was shot in his left shoulder. Id.
49 Id. at 318-19.
49 MATTHIESSPIN, .supra note 1, at 159.
47 1d. at 158.
48 See id. at 158-68.
99 1d. at 168.
50 MArrntEssm, supra note 1, at 193. According to Matthiessen, this is demonstrated by the
fact that Joseph Trimbach, regional head of the FBI, was en route from Minneapolis to Pine
Ridge within an hour of the firing of the first shots. Id. Tritnbach sought to enlist the National
Guard and commandeered high explosives brought in via Marine jet. Id.
91 See id. at 198-201. Matthiessen states, for example, that when the Jumping Bull family
returned to their home after the shoot-out, they found that the FBI had ransacked the house,
broken down the door, smashed furniture and shot the paintings that hung on the walls. Id. at
200. A few days after the shoot-out, the situation deteriorated to the point that the residents of
Oglala marched on the FBI and BIA roadblocks, forcing the agents to abandon their stations. /d
at 201.
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with a high-velocity small caliber weapon fired at point-blank range."
Over 125 bullet holes were found in the agents' cars, but only five shell
casings attributable to the agents' guns were recovered.'s
Leonard Peltier was one of four prime suspects in the FBI's inves-
tigation of the murders. 54
 Peltier had been alleged to be riding in the
vehicle the agents followed onto the Jumping Bull compound!!` Fur-
thermore, witnesses stated that Peltier was carrying an AR-15 rifle on
the day of the shoot-out, which was the highest caliber weapon used
by any AIM member. 56
 An AR-15, ("Wichita AR-15") found on the
Kansas Turnpike on September 10, 1975, in damaged condition, was
believed to be the weapon Peltier had used in the Jumping Bull shoot-
out." Additionally, investigators at the crime scene had recovered a
.223 caliber cartridge casing from the trunk of Agent Coler's car, which
could have been fired from Peltier's gun. 58
 Based on this evidence, the
hunt for Leonard Peltier began.
Leonard Peltier, Bob Robideau, Dean Butler and Jimmy Eagle, all
AIM members, were charged with and sought for the murders of agents
Coler and Williams.59
 The charges against Eagle were subsequently
dismissed, despite the claims of several witnesses, including Eagle him-
self, who admitted he had participated in the killings."° Peltier, Butler
and Robideau all stood trial for the murders of Coler and Williams. 9 '
D. The Trial of Butler and Robideau
Dean Butler and Bob Robideau were jointly tried in Cedar Rapids,
Iowa, for two counts of the first degree murders of agents Coler and
Williams." The prosecution's case centered on the testimony of several
52 Peltier I, 585 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1978).
55 Id.
54 Id. The other suspects were Jimmy Eagle, Dean Butler and Bob Robideau, all of whom had
charges brought against them for the murders, Id.
55 Id. at 319. Questions have arisen as to the validity of the claim that Peltier was riding in
the vehicle. See Peltier v. Denman, No. 92-1129, 1993 WL 241915 at *11 (8th Cir. 1993). The FBI
described the vehicle at various points in its investigation as a red pickup, a red Scout, a red jeep,
and an orange and white pickup. Id.
56 Peltier 1, 585 F.2d at 319.
57 Id. at 320. The Wichita AR-15 was damaged due to a car explosion. Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 318.
MATTHI ESSEN, supra note 1, at 317. Matthiessen discovered that United States Attorney
Evan Hultman thought that the case against Jimmy Eagle was weak, despite Eagle's own admis-
sions of participating in the murders, and recommended dismissing the case so that the full
prosecutorial weight of the federal government could be directed against Peltier. Id.
14 Peltier 1, 585 F.2d at 318.
62 Id. at 318; MATT11 ESSEN, Supra note 1, at 280-315. This trial, like Peltier's, is not published,
and all infbrmation, where necessary, is derived primarily front Matthiessen's book containing
extensive research and documentation of the trial records.
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FBI agents and eyewitnesses to the shoot-out. 63 The defense demon-
strated that certain witnesses had lied both to the grand jury and
during the trial itself, 64 that certain testimony was at best questionable, 83
and that the FBI had coerced witnesses during its investigation. 66 Un-
der the auspices of Judge McManus, the defense presented the jury
with evidence of the FBI's coercion of witnesses and a history of FBI
misconduct in investigating prior crimes. 67 After five days of deadlock,
on July 16, 1976, the jury returned a verdict finding both Butler and
Robideau not guilty on all counts. 68
E. Leonard Peltier's Extradition and Trial
After the shoot-out on the Jumping Bull compound, Leonard
Peltier made his way to Vancouver, from where he was eventually
extradited to the United States on December 16, 1976. 69 Peltier was
extradited based partly on pressure from the Justice Department. 7°
According to Matthiessen, another influential factor in Peltier's extra-
It is interesting to note the state of anxiety and fear created by the FBI in Cedar Rapids
during the trial. See MATTHIESSEN, supra note I, at 283-84. The FBI published many reports,
spreading rumors of AIM's plans to 'kill-a-cop-a-day" and commit acts of violence on the populace
of Cedar Rapids. Id. Matthiessen cites, for example, the fact that the FBI informed the local police
that two thousand highly armed AIM members would invade Cedar Rapids in an attempt to
assassinate the governor, blow up various dams, plants and law enforcement centers, burn
farmers, snipe at tourists and take unspecified action at Mount Rushmore. Id. at 283.
63 See MArritiEssEN, supra note 1, at 287-98.
" Id. at 290.
I5 See id. at 294-97. Matthiessen tells of how the prosecution put James Harper on the stand
to testify that, in the short time he had shared a jail cell with Dean Butler, Butler confessed to
the murders in great detail. Id. at 295. In return for government protection, Harper filled in all
the gaps in the prosecution's case. Id. at 297. Jury foreman Robert Bolin later commented that
"not one single person believed one single word of what [Harper] said." Id. at 313.
66 See id. at 300-03. Matthiessen recounts the testimony of John Trudell, who attested to the
questioning of one witness, Annie Mae Aquas!), who claimed to have been threatened by the FBI.
Id. at 301. Annie Mae Aquash did not testify because she was later found dead, with a bullet hole
in the back of her head. Id. at 256. The BIA and FBI investigated her death and concluded that
she had died of natural causes. See id. at 256.
67 Side By Side: How Two Thais Compare, NAT'L LJ., June 25,1990, at 30 (evidence included
misconduct in COIN'I'ELPRO and the Church Report on domestic spying). CO1NTELPRO,
which stands for Counter-Intelligence Program, was an FBI surveillance operation that targeted
domestic political groups, including AIM, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAI, USA, UntaTED STATES OF AMERICA, Supra note 9, at 29 n.23.
68 Peltier I, 585 F2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1978); MATTHIESSEN, .supra note I, at 312. Throughout
the trial, Peltier had been included in descriptions of events surrounding the Shootout, but had
its no way been singled out to have acted differently from Butler and Robideau. Id. at 317.
Matthiessen has concluded that had Peltier been tried with Butler and Robideau at Cedar Rapids,
it seems almost certain that he would also have been acquitted. Id.
69 MATTHIESSEN, supra note 1, at 319.
70 Id. at 318.
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dition was the testimony of Myrtle Poor Bear. 7 ' Myrtle Poor Bear's
affidavit stipulated that she was Leonard Peltier's girlfriend and had
been physically forced to watch Peltier execute the FBI agents. 72 She
subsequently admitted, however, that she was sixty miles away from the
Jumping Bull compound at the time of the shoot-out and had never
met Peltier prior to his trial at Fargo." Poor Bear's original affidavit,
withheld from Peltier's attorneys and the Vancouver court, contra-
dicted even this, stating that she had left the compound prior to June
26, the day of the shoot-out." Nonetheless, based on Poor Bear's
testimony, Peltier was extradited to the United States to stand trial for
the murders of agents Coler and Williams."
In a jury trial at Fargo, North Dakota, with Judge Paul Benson
presiding, Leonard Peltier was tried and convicted of the first degree
murders of agents Coler and Williams." The government's case against
Peltier was primarily composed of circumstantial evidence." Judge
Benson disallowed most of the defense's evidence, greatly crippling
their attempts to demonstrate that the FBI had constructed evidence
to convict Peltier by any means necessary." After a twenty-five-day trial
and a guilty verdict, Judge Benson administered the harshest punish-
ment available, sentencing Peltier to two consecutive life terms in
federal prison."
71 Id. at 341. After using Myrtle Poor Bear's affidavit to extradite Peltier, United States
Attorney Evan Hultman referred to her as "incompetent in the utter, utter, utter, ultimate sense
of incompetence." Id. at 445.
72 Id. at 339-40.
78 Id. at 342.
Mivi -riiiEssEN,,supra note 1, in 319. This conflict in testimony may have resulted, according
to Poor Bear's own allegations, from threats by FBI agents to her and her young child. See id at
342-44. Specifically, Poor Bear alleged that FBI agents, in the course of questioning her, men-
tioned the mysterious murder of a young Indian woman, showed Poor Bear pictures of the corpse,
and suggested that she too could be executed with impunity. Id. at 342. See supra mite 66 for a
discussion of the murder of Annie Mae Aquash after she was questioned by the FBI.
75 1d, at 319, 341. In April of 1978, British Columbia Supreme Court justice R.P. Anderson,
in commenting on Peltier's extradition, declared: "tilt seems clear to me that the conduct of the
U.S. government involved misconduct from inception." Id. at 319.
7(1 Pettier 1, 585 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1978); but if. Peltier v, Heilman, No. 92-1129, 1993
WI.. 241915, at *4 (8th Cir. 1993) (dicta asserting that Peltier was also tried as an airier and
abettor). For a RAI account of Peltier's trial, see MArrillESSEN, supra note 1, at 320-61. The FBI's
behavior during the trial was similar to its actions at Cedar Rapids. See id. at 320. Sec also supra
note 62 for a discussion of the Fill's behavior at the Cedar Rapids trial. Matthiessen contends
that the FBI furnished local police and media with unsubstantiated rumors of the pending threat
of armed Indians laying siege to the town. MA1111E:MEN, supra note I, at 320, The twelve white
jurors were sequestered, constantly guarded by SWAT teams, and shuttled to the courtroom in a
bus with taped windows. Id.
" Peltier I, 585 F.2d at 319.
78 See MArrillESSF-N, supra note I, at 323, 341, 357.
79 Peltier. I, 585 F.2d at 318; MATTHIESSEN, SUpM note 1, at 364.
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The government's case centered around two major lines of rea-
soning.8° First, the government presented evidence that Peltier may
have been riding in the vehicle followed by the agents onto the Jump-
ing Bull compound, and that he may have thought he was being
pursued for an outstanding arrest warrant. 8 ' The government argued
that this evidence provided some motive for the killings." Second, the
government linked Peltier with an AR-15 high-velocity rifle ("Wichita
AR-15") that had been recovered by police officers, in damaged con-
dition, on the Kansas Turnpike." The crucial piece of evidence linking
this rifle to the murders was a .223 shell casing recovered from the
trunk of Coler's car." Although an FBI laboratory report of October
31, 1975, prepared by ballistics expert Evan Hodge, stated that the
Wichita AR-15 could not be associated with the .223 casing, nearly four
months later, Hodge concluded that the Wichita AR-15 theoretically
could be linked to the casing in question. 88 Hodge asserted that, al-
though the gun itself could not be accurately compared to the .223
casing, because it had been badly damaged in an explosion, the bolt
from the gun had been removed, loaded in another AR-15, and yielded
markings similar to those on the .223 casing." Hodge thus concluded
80 See Peltier 1, 585 F.2d at 319-20.
81 Id. at 319. See supra note 55 for a discussion of inconsistencies in the FBI's identification
of the vehicle the agents followed onto the compound. The outstanding arrest warrant related
to an attempted murder charge from an incident in Wisconsin in 1972. Peltier I, 585 17.2d at 321.
Peltier eventually stood trial and was acquitted on this charge. Id. at 322 n.6; MATrullEssElsi, supra
note 1, at 368.
82 See Peltier 1,585 F.2d at 322.
83 Id. at 319-20. There was evidence that there were several AR-15s around during the
shoot-out, not to mention Agent Coler's own rifle and several other weapons that fit the descrip-
tion of the high-velocity weapon used to kill the agents. MArriintssEN, supra note 1, at 354-55.
84 Peltier I, 585 F.2d at 320; MATMIESSEN, supra note 1, at 352. The government's theory at
trial was that the casing had been ejected from the rifle into the trunk of Agent Coler's car when
the fatal shots were fired. Peltier v. Henman, No. 92-1129,1993 WI.. 241915, at *2 (8th Cir. 1993).
United States Attorney Crooks referred to the casing as "probably the most important piece of
evidence in this case." MA -rrtliEssEN, supra note 1, at 352. The circumstances surrounding this
casing are questionable. See id. at 352-53. The casing went unnoticed by the five FBI agents who
searched the death scene, and was not mentioned in their 302 investigation report of Agent
Cunningham, head of the FBI firearms division, who inspected the car personally. Id. at 353. The
casing reportedly was discovered by Agent Lodge, who had checked the car for fingerprints; its
discovery turns up on the last page of Lodge's notes for that day (although he took no notes
while inspecting Agent Williams' car on the same day). Id.
85 MAT19111,„SSEN, supra note 1, at 353-54.
86 Peltier 1,585 F.2d at 310-20. Hodge's basic assertion was that, due to the gun's damaged
condition, a more accurate firing pin analysis was impossible, but a less accurate markings
comparison yielded a positive result. See id. See infra notes 180-82 for a discussion of FBI
documents indicating that the more accurate firing pin analysis was conducted and yielded
negative results.
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that the Wichita AR-15, which had been linked to Peltier, had fired the
.223 casing found in the trunk of Coler's car." This casing may have
been one of the fatal shots fired at the shoot-out.88
The defense's case was based on the theory that the government
was attempting to frame Peltier. 89 According to the defense, the FBI
had decided in the first days of the investigation that Peltier was guilty.°
Consequently, the defense argued that the FBI constructed evidence
and engaged in other forms of misconduct to support Peltier's guilt
and meant to see Peltier convicted by any means necessary."
Judge Benson ruled from the outset that evidence would be lim-
ited primarily to the events of June 26, 1975, the day of the shoot-out. 92
Although the defense had prepared two weeks of testimony, the trial
court disallowed about four-fifths of its evidence." The defense was
prevented from presenting evidence of the suspect affidavits used to
extradite Peltier, a background summary of the violence on the Pine
Ridge reservation, the FBI's extensive persecution of AIM, and the
verdict or any testimony from the Butler-Robideau trial at Cedar Rapids
for the same crime." The result, according to Matthiessen, was that the
prosecution put on witnesses who directly contradicted their testimony
in the prior Cedar Rapids trial, and the defense was prevented from
impeaching those witnesses.''' In the end, based on fifteen days of
testimony from the prosecution and two and a half days from the
defense, the jury convicted Peltier of both counts of first degree mur-
der.96
F. Leonard Peltier's First Appeal
Leonard Peltier appealed his conviction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ("Peltier r) .97 Peltier sought
reversal of his conviction, alleging that five errors were committed by
87
 See Peltier 1, 585 F.2d at 320. The ballistics testimony in the trial transcript fails to establish
Peltier's presence at Oglala, much less his identity as the killer. MATI'llIESSEN, supra note l, at
355.
99 See Peltier 1, 585 F.2d at 320.
MArl'IllESSEN, .111pra note 1, at 341.
'°Id.
91 Id.
02 1d. at 323.
93 Id. at 357.
9 '1 MAVIIIIESSEN, supra note 1, at 323; Side by Side: How Two Trials Compare, supra note 67,
at 30.
MATIMIESSEN, supra note 1, at 323.
Id. at 357, 361.
97
 Peltier I, 585 F.2(1 314, 3211 (8th Cir. 1978).
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the trial court." First, Peltier argued that the trial court's admission
into evidence of his flight from the Pine Ridge reservation after the
shoot-out, accounts of other alleged crimes, and the circumstances
surrounding the recovery of the Wichita AR-15 were prejudicial,
inflammatory, and resulted in a denial of due process s° The Peltier I
court granted great deference to trial judge Paul Benson, who had
heard the evidence,'" and held that even if judge Benson had abused
his discretion in admitting the evidence of flight and other crimes, the
error was harmless.'°' The Peltier I court similarly found, without de-
ciding that the Wichita AR-15 evidence was erroneously admitted, that
there was no plain error and that the evidence was not unfairly preju-
dicial to Peltier.'°2
Second, Peltier argued that the trial court deprived him of a fair
trial and compulsory process by refusing to instruct the jury on the
defense's theory of an FBI frame-up and by ruling inadmissible the
bulk of his proof of fabricated evidence.m The court likewise rejected
these arguments. 104 As to the jury instruction, the Peltier I court held
that the testimony of witnesses at trial provided no support for the
instruction that the government induced them to testify falsely,'°5 and
that the instruction was essentially a credibility test, not one that incor-
porated Peltier's theory of defense.'" The court also found that Judge
Benson's refusal to admit most of the defense's evidence relating to its
theory of an FBI frame-up was not an abuse of discretion, because "the
evidence was only minimally relevant." 107
98 Id.
99
 See id at 320-28.
10° Id. at 321. Deference is given to trial judge as propounded in United States v. Bohr, 581
F.2d 1294,1298-99 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Weir, 575 F.2d 668,670 (8th Cir. 1978), Id.
101
 Peltier 1, 585 F.2d at 325. At least, the appeals court was convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that it was harmless under Weir. Id.; see Weir, 575 F.2d at 671.
1 °2 Peltier I, 585 F.2d at 326.
1 °3 See id. at 328-34.
1 °4 See id. at 329-34.
1 °5 Id. at 328-29. The defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to have the jury instructed on
any theory of defense that is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence, however
tenuous. Id. at 328.
1 °6 Peltier I, 585 F.2d at 328. The refused jury instruction stated:
Testimony has been adduced in this case which if believed by you shows that the
government induced witnesses to testify falsely. If you believe that the government,
or any of its agents, induced any witness to testify falsely in this case (or in any
related case), this is affirmative evidence of the weakness of the government's case.
Id.
1 °7 Id. at 332. The court found that Myrtle Poor Bear's testimony lacked probative value
because she was not a reliable witness. Id. The defense, however, sought to offer this testimony
to bring into question the validity of other witnesses who had testified for the prosecution. Id.
July 1993]
	 PELTIER	 913
The Peltier I court also rejected Peltier's remaining three claims
of error.' 48
 The court denied Peltier's claim that the trial court had
erred in refusing to reread testimony to the jury, because this was not
an abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Benson." The Peltier I
court also rejected the claim that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over Peltier, because he was extradited in violation of the Webster-Ash-
burton treaty."° The court found this claim to be lacking in sub-
stance."' Finally, the court rejected Peltier's claim of collateral estop-
pel, because he was not a party to the Butler-Robideau trial." 2 The
court therefore affirmed Peltier's conviction.' is
After his conviction, Peltier was sent to Marion Penitentiary in
Illinois, from where he began the appellate process." 4
 As previously
noted, Peltier's first appeal unsuccessfully sought a reversal of his
conviction due to allegations of several errors committed by the trial
court."5
 Subsequently, on several occasions, Peltier uncovered evi-
dence which was withheld at trial and created doubt as to the validity
of his conviction." 6
 After the discovery of this evidence, Peltier sought
a new trial, and, although he won a limited victory on his second
appeal, he was denied a new trial on his third and final attetnpt." 7
`Phis would have been accomplished by showing the FBI's harassment of Poor Bear and its use
of her false testimony to extradite Peltier from Canada. See MATCHIKSSEN, SUprit note 1, at 319,
342-44.
lu/1
 See Peltier 1, 585 F.2d at 334-35.
1 °9 Id. at 334, The decision to reread testimony as requested by the jury rests within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Id. (citing United States v. Ballard, 535 F.2d 400, 407 (8th Cir,), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 918 (1976)).
II° Peltier I, 585 F.2d at 334-35. The treaty provides;
M he United States and fier Britannic Majesty shall deliver up to justice all persons
who, being charged with the crime of murder shall seek asylum, or shall be found,
within the territories of the other. Provided that this shall only he done upon such
evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the ingitive or
person so charged shall be (Mind, would justify his apprehension and conuni mien t
for trial.
Id. at 335.
in Id. Peltier's claim was that his extradition was based on fraudulent testimony. Id. at 334-35.
The court, however, found substantial evidence in the record to support his extradition, excluding
the fraudulent. testimony. Id. at 335.
112 .1d.
115 1d.
114 MA•rui•.ss•N, supra note 1, at 364. First-time convicts are rarely sentenced to serve their
time at the Marion high-security penitentiary. Id.
115 See supra notes 97-113 for a discussion of Peltier I.
Hsi See Peltier III, 800 F.2d 772, 773-76 (8th Cir. 1986); Peltier II, 731 F.2c1 550, 551-53 (8th
Cir. 1984).
''7 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 779-80 (denial of new trial on basis of concealed evidence); Peltier
II, 731 F.2d at 555 (remand to trial court to hold evidentiary hearing and determine if new trial
warran ted).
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Peltier's second and third appeals are examined in Section III, but a
thorough understanding of the questions presented therein first re-
quires an examination of the law pertaining to the granting of a new
trial on the basis of concealed evidence.
IL STANDARDS FOR A NEW TRIAL
Courts have long found problematic the question of when and on
what basis a defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to a new trial." 8 In
the 1935 case of Mooney v. Holohan, the United States Supreme Court
held that a contrivance by the state to deliberately deceive the court
and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured is
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice."' The Court
restated this policy in the 1942 case of Pyle v. Kansas, asserting that
imprisonment resulting from perjured testimony, knowingly used by
state authorities to obtain a conviction, constitutes a deprivation of
rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution.'" The Court later ex-
panded this doctrine to cases where the state does not solicit false
evidence but allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.' 2 '
A. Brady v. Maryland
In the 1963 case of Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme
Court determined that relief was warranted where evidence had been
withheld, not falsified, at trial.' 22 The Brady Court held that the with-
holding of evidence by the prosecution violates due process where the
evidence had been requested prior to trial, is favorable to the accused,
and is material either to guilt or punishment.'" In Brady, the Court
addressed the issue of concealment, rather than fraudulent use, of
evidence by the prosecution.' 24
The defendant, Brady, had been found guilty of murder and
sentenced to death.' 25 Brady later uncovered evidence of another de-
fendant's admission of guilt to the crime, and discovered that this
evidence had previously been requested and withheld from the de-
118 See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16
(1941); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
"9 294 U.S. at 112.
12°317 U.S. at 215-16.
121 Napue, 360 U.S. at 272.
122 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 84.
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fense.' 26
 Brady moved for a new trial, but was only granted a rehearing
on the question of punishment, not guilt.' 27 The Brady Court refused
to retry the question of guilt because Brady had been convicted as an
accomplice, and therefore the concealed evidence would have had no
impact on the jury's finding of guilt."' In determining whether a retrial
of the question of punishment was warranted, the Brady Court noted
that it could not put itself in the place of the jury and determine
whether it would have attached any significance to this evidence in
considering the defendant's punishment.' 29
 Therefore, concluding
that the withheld evidence was favorable to the defendant, material to
punishment (but not guilt), and that the withholding of the evidence
was prejudicial to the defendant, resulting in a denial of due process,
the Court upheld the retrial of punishment, but refused to retry the
question of guilt.' 3° Thus, although the defendant fared poorly, Brady's
significance stems from the Supreme Court's adoption of a framework
with which to deal with the concealment of material evidence."'
B. United States v. Agurs
In the 1976 case of United States v. Agars, the United States Su-
preme Court expanded the scope of the Brady doctrine to encompass
situations where the concealed evidence had not been specifically
requested.' 32
 Prior to this, the Brady test for withheld evidence only
applied where the defense had requested the evidence prior to or
during trial."' In Agurs, the defendant had been convicted of second
degree murder."' The defendant, Agurs, contended on appeal that the
prosecution failed to supply the defense with background information
about the victim's criminal record."' Agurs had never requested this
evidence, but he argued that it should have been disclosed because it
would have supported his claim of self-defense."" Although the Court
failed to find that the non-disclosure warranted a new trial, the Court
126 Id.
127
 Brady, 373 U.S. at 84-85.
128 Id. at 88 (quoting Brady v. State, 174 A,2d 167, 171 (Md. 1961)),
129 1d. In Maryland, the jury determines not only guilt, but also punishment. Id. at 85.
111° See id. at 86-89.
151
 See id. at 87-88.
152 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
I " Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The test also requires that the evidence be favorable	 the.....e accused
and material to either punishment or sentence. Id.
134 427 U.S. at 98.
155 1d. at 98-99.
156 1d. at 99, 100.
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held that some situations may give rise to a duty to disclose such
evidence, even when no request is made.'"
The Agurs Court's reasoning expanded the Brady doctrine in two
distinct ways. 138 First, the Court stipulated that where a broad general
request for all exculpatory or favorable evidence is made by the de-
fense, the prosecutor violates the Brady doctrine if evidence is withheld
that is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the
prosecution notice of a duty to produce.'" Second, the Court deter-
mined that where no request for evidence is made, the prosecutor does
not violate his or her duty of disclosure unless the omission of the
evidence is of sufficient significance to result in a denial of due proc-
ess.'" Noting that the Constitution does not require complete and
detailed disclosure of all investigatory materials in the prosecution's
files, the Court classified the mandatorily disclosed evidence as "sub-
stantial material evidence." 141 The Court described the evidence to be
disclosed as that which is highly probative of innocence, and not
merely preliminary, challenged or speculative.' 43
The Agurs Court promulgated specific guidelines for the granting
of a new trial, which reflect the overriding concern of justice in deter-
mining guilt.'" Specifically, the Court required that in cases where the
evidence was not in the state's possession, but obtained from a neutral
source, the defendant must satisfy the severe burden of demonstrating
that the newly discovered evidence would have resulted in acquittal.'"
This guideline is based on the fact that in this situation, the prosecu-
tion really has not withheld anything.' 45 Where the prosecution has
concealed the evidence, however, the standard is weaker, requiring
only that the omitted evidence create a reasonable doubt that did not
otherwise exist.'" Furthermore, the Court stated that, if the verdict is
already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor
137 See id. at 108, 114.
138 See id. at 106-417.
139 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 109 (quoting Chief justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court in In re Imbler,
387 P2d 6, 14 (Cal. 1963)).
142 Id. at 109 n.16, 110.
143 1d. at 112.
144 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111. This is the standard for motions for a new trial pursuant to FED.
R. CR,M. P. 33. Id. at 111 n.19.
145 See id. at 111.
146 Id. at 111-12. The Agurs Court's rationale for this standard was that, where a finding of
guilt was supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, if the omitted evidence creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, then constitutional error has been committed. Id.
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importance might be sufficient to create such a reasonable doubt.'`'?
Thus, the Agurs Court expanded the Brady doctrine to all cases of
withheld evidence and allowed for relief where the concealed evidence
could or would have created a reasonable doubt, depending on the
specific facts of each case.'"
C. United States v. Bagley
In 1985, in United States v. Bagley, the United States Supreme
Court tightened the requirements for the granting of a new trial.'" In
Bagley, the Court set out the general rule that impeachment evidence,
which had been withheld by the prosecutor at trial, fell within the
Brady rule just as exculpatory evidence did.' 5" More importantly, the
Bagley Court strengthened and clarified the level of materiality of
concealed evidence necessary to warrant a new trial.'''
In Bagley, the defendant had been convicted of federal narcotics
violations. 152 Prior to trial, the defendant, Bagley, filed a discovery
motion seeking to uncover any deals the government's witnesses had
made with the governmene" The prosecution replied that no such
deals had been made.'" Bagley later uncovered documents showing
that the chief government witnesses in fact had been paid for their
testimony.'" The Bagley Court held that this impeachment evidence,
and not just exculpatory evidence, was protected under Brady and its
progeny.'"
The Bagley Court proceeded to clarify the standard of materiality
of concealed evidence necessary to warrant a new tria1. 157 The Court
reasoned that evidence is material only if there is a reasonable prob-
ability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.' 58 The Court further
clarified the materiality standard by stating that a reasonable prob-
' 47 1d. at 113.
148 See id. at 112-13,
149
 See 473 U.S. 667,682 (1985).
150 1d. at 676 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,154 (1972)).
151 see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
152 1d. at 671.
153 Id. at 669-70.
151 Id. at 670.
155 1d. at 671.
156 Bagi,7, 473 U.S. at 676.
157 See id. at 682.
158 Id. This test was originally formulated for the granting of a new trial where the defense
attorney had acted incompetently in the original trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694 (1984).
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ability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out-
come of the trial.'" The high standard of materiality for newly discov-
ered evidence presupposes that all the essential elements of a presump-
tively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the trial whose
results are challenged.'" The Supreme Court foreclosed all previous
forms of analysis by dictating that this standard was applicable to all
cases of concealed evidence that fell under the Brady test, whether the
evidence was specifically requested, generally requested or not re-
quested at all."''
Although the withholding of crucial information would hamper
a defendant's plan of attack at trial, the Bagley Court instructed other
courts to consider directly any adverse effect the prosecutor's failure
to respond may have had on the preparation and presentation of the
defendant's case.'" This necessarily includes an assessment of the to-
tality of the circumstances of the proceeding, with an awareness of the
difficulty of reconstructing the course that the defense would have
taken had it received the evidence.'" Thus, Bagley imposed the same
stringent standard of materiality on all Brady cases of withheld evi-
dence, regardless of the form of the concealment.' 64
D. Post-Bagley Developments
The United States Supreme Court has continued to uphold the
strict reasonable probability test of the materiality of concealed evi-
dence established in Bagley.I 88 In 1987, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the
Court ruled that classified state files should be disclosed to the defen-
dant where the files are material to the defense. 166 In so holding, the
Court reasoned that evidence is material only if there exists a reason-
able probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the trial would have been different. 167 Consistent with
Bagley, the Court stipulated that a reasonable probability is a prob-
ability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
trial.' 68
159 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
166 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
161 /WI* 473 U.S. at 682.
1 €2 Id. at 682-83.
161 Id. at 683.
164 See id. at 682.
165 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2524, 2530-32 (1992); Pennsylvania y. Ritchie, 480
U,S. 39, 57 (1987).
;66 480 U.S. at 57-58.
367
 Id. at 57 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).
166 Id. Similarly, in the 1992 case of Sawyer v. Whitley, the United States Supreme Court
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In summary, the current standard for the granting of a new trial
represents a combination of the Brady and Bagley approaches. 1C9 Brady
dictates that the withholding of evidence warrants a new trial where
the concealed evidence is favorable to the defendant and material to
guilt or punishment.'" The Bagley decision stipulates that the con-
cealed evidence is material to guilt or punishment only where, had it
been disclosed at trial, a reasonable probability exists that the result of
the proceeding would have been different."' Bagley defines this rea-
sonable probability as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome of the trial and instructs judges to consider the entire
trial record in making this determination.'"
III. PELTIER'S SECOND AND THIRD APPEALS: CONCEALED EVIDENCE
After his conviction and failed appeal, Leonard Peltier discovered
documents through the Freedom of Information Act that were relevant
to his case but had been withheld at trial. 17" Peltier's second and third
appeals focused on the validity of his conviction in light of these
concealed documents.' 74
 In his second appeal ("Peltier IP), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit provided Peltier with an
opportunity to demonstrate, through an evidentiary hearing at the trial
level, that a new trial was warranted due to the concealment of material
evidence.'" After failing at this evidentiary hearing, Peltier discovered
additional concealed evidence and filed a third appeal ("Peltier III") . 176
Peltier III focused on the question of whether the concealed evidence
was material to the outcome of Peltier's trial, and thus warranted a new
trial under the Brady and Bagley decisions.' 77
A. Peltier II, 1984
After his first appeal, Peltier examined thousands of documents
obtained through the Freedom of Information Act regarding the gov-
applied the Bagley standard of materiality to the withholding of a child's affidavit in conjunction
with a sentencing hearing in which the death penalty was imposed. 112 S. Ct. at 2528,2530-32.
The Court determined, however, that the evidence would not have affected the hearing. Id. at
2529.
169 See id, at 2530-32; Ritchie, 480 U.S at 57.
17°373 U.S. at 87.
171 473 U.S. at 682.
172
 Id. at 682-83.
173
 Peltier III, 800 F.2d 772,773 (8th Cir. 1986); Peltier II, 731 F.2d 550,551 (8th Cir. 1984).
174
 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 774; Peltier II, 731 F.2d at 551.
175 Peltier II, 731 F.2d at 555.
176 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 773.
1 "Id. at 777,
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ern ment's investigation of his case.' 78 Within these documents, Peltier
uncovered evidence calling into question the validity of the FBI ballis-
tics tests linking the .223 caliber shell casing found in Agent Coler's
car trunk to the Wichita AR-15.m This newly discovered evidence
called into question ballistics expert Hodge's testimony at Peltier's trial
and his late December 1985-early January 1986 lab report showing
that, although the casing may have come from the Wichita AR-15, this
could not be conclusively determined due to severe damage to the
gun's firing pin and breech face."'" Through the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, Peltier uncovered an October 2, 1975 FBI teletype which
stated that the .223 caliber rifle contained a different firing pin from
that used in the Pine Ridge shoot-out. 18 ' This evidence would have
discredited Hodge's testimony at trial that no conclusion could have
been reached from a firing pin analysis of the Wichita AR-15, and
would have seriously undermined the prosecution's inference that the
gun had, in fact, fired the fatal bullets. 182
On April 20, 1982, with this new evidence in hand, Peltier filed a
motion to vacate the judgment, and a motion for a new trial pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 183 On December 15, 1982, Peltier filed a motion
to disqualify the district court from considering the § 2255 motion
along with a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33. 184 The district court, Judge Paul Benson presiding, de-
nied all motions."'" Judge Benson made this ruling without the benefit
of an evidentiary hearing. 186
Peltier appealed Judge Benson's decision, arguing that under the
Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland, the FBI documents
should have been revealed to him at his original trial.' 87 On appeal,
178 Peltier 11, 731 F,2d at 551.
179 Id. at 552-53. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text Sir a discussion of the
relationship of the casing and the Wichita AR-15 to Peltier, as established at trial.
180 Peltier II, 731 E2c1 at 552-53.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 553.
I"Peltier //, 731 F.2d at 551.28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides in pertinent part;
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court ... claiming the right to be released
upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States ... may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
184 Peltier II, 731 F.2d at 551. Rule 33 provides; The court on motion of a defendant may
grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice." Fan. R. CR1M. P. 33.
185 United States v. Peltier, 553 F. Stipp. 886,890 (1982).
188 Peltier //, 731 F.2d at 551.
187 1d, at 551. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the withholding of
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Pettier contended that Judge Benson erred in denying him an eviden-
tiary hearing in which he could prove his substantive claims.'" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with
Peltier that the October 2 teletype raised factual questions bearing
directly on his legal claim that the government had denied him due
process in withholding the teletype.'" The court remanded the case to
Judge Benson with instructions that an evidentiary hearing be held to
determine whether a new trial was warranted.'""
On remand, Judge Benson held an evidentiary hearing.'"' The
government contended that the October 2 teletype was an advanced
version of FBI ballistics expert Hodge's October 31 laboratory report,
which had been admitted into evidence at the Fargo trial.'" 2 Agent
Hodge stipulated that, although he had information by September 24,
1975, that Agents Coler and Williams were shot at point-blank range
with a high-velocity weapon, that the Wichita AR-15 was probably used
by Peltier, and that witness Norman Brown had reported seeing Peltier
approaching the wounded agents armed with an AR-15 or M-16, he
failed to compare the .223 cartridge with the Wichita AR-I5 until
January of 1976. 1 " Hodge testified that, because he never received any
specific priority request to examine the .223 casing found in Agent
Coler's trunk, he did not examine it until January of 1976.'" Thus,
Hodge asserted that the October 2 teletype did not refer to the .223
casing found in Coler's trunk, but to the other casings found on the
Jumping Bull compound.'"
Judge Benson was satisfied with this explanation, especially in light
of the fact that Hodge's lab notes dated after the October 2 teletype
describe his examination of the crucial .223 casing.'" The fact that
material exculpatory evidence constitutes a violation of the defendant's due process rights. 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
199 Pdtier II, 731 F.2d at 551.
i" Id. at 554.
1941 M, at 555.
191
 United States v. Peltier, 609 F. Supp. 1143, 1144 (1985).
192fd, at 1146,
11111 ,t(t. at 1151-52.
194 Id. at 1151. Peltier later uncovered FBI documents directly contradicting this testimony.
See Peltier III, 800 F.2d 772, 776 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986). Specifically, a July 21, 1975 document
accompanying the shipment of the .223 cartridge to Hodge requested that it be compared with
the weapons attributed to the Pine Ridge shoot-out; a September 15 memorandum requested a
comparison of the Wichita AR-15 to casings from unsolved crimes; and a September 27, 1985
transmission requested the comparison of the Wichita AR-15 to cartridges from the Pine Ridge
shoot-out. Id.
195 United States v. Peltier, 609 F. Supp. at 1146.
156 Id. at 1151-52.
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Hodge had testified that the lab notes were written by either him or
his assistant, when they were actually in the handwriting of other
agents, did not detract from Hodge's credibility in the eyes of Judge
Benson.' 97 As a result of this testimony, Judge Benson concluded that
the October 2 teletype was merely cumulative in relation to the evi-
dence presented at Peltier's trial, did not evince perjured testimony
and would not have affected the outcome of the trial when evaluated
in the context of the entire trial record.' 98 The trial court thus denied
Peltier's request for a new trial.' 99
B. Peltier [II, 1986
After losing his second appeal, Peltier again uncovered further
exculpatory evidence from FBI files obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act. 290 The evidence consisted of a July 21,1975 document
accompanying the shipment of the .223 to Agent Hodge requesting a
comparison of the cartridge with the weapons attributed to the Pine
Ridge shoot-out, a September 15 memorandum requesting the com-
parison of the Wichita AR-15 to cartridges from unknown subject
crimes, and a September 27 teletype requesting comparisons of the
Wichita AR-15 with cartridges from the Pine Ridge shoot-out. 20 ' These
documents directly contradicted Hodge's testimony in the evidentiary
hearing, where he had claimed not to have been aware of any particu-
lar urgency connected with the .223 casing and not to have received
any priority requests to examine it. 202
On the basis of this evidence, Peltier again sought to appeal Judge
Benson's earlier decision. 2°' In an opinion written by Judge Gerald
Heaney, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that, although the possibility existed that the jury would have acquitted
Leonard Peltier had the concealed documents been properly dis-
closed, the court was not sufficiently convinced that such a result would
197 Id. After Hodge testified that the notes were either in his handwriting or that of his
assistant, Twardouski, he recanted and admitted that he did not know whose writing accounted
for the lab notes. Id. at 1151. Later, another FBI agent, William Albrecht, admitted to writing
some of the notes. Id. at 1152.
198 Id. at 1153-54.
199 1d. at 1154.
2°0 See Peltier III, 800 F.2d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 1986).
2° 1 Id. at 776 n.4.
21r2
	 at 776.
2113 Id. at 774.
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have in fact been reached.2" The court therefore denied Peltier's
request for a new tria1. 2"5
Recognizing that the critical piece of evidence in support of the
FBI's theory of Peltier's guilt was the .223 caliber cartridge, the Peltier
III court concluded that the concealed FBI documents (which related
to the validity of the inference that Peltier's AR-15 had fired the .223
casing) were favorable to the defense and might have been material to
the outcome of the tria1. 206
 The court reasoned that this new evidence
would have allowed the defense to more effectively cross-examine
certain government witnesses who had linked Peltier and the AR-15 to
the actual fatal gun shots through the .223 cartridge. 207
 The court,
however, was not convinced that it was reasonably probable, as required
by Bagley, that the jury would have returned a different verdict.208
 The
court reasoned that other circumstantial evidence linking Peltier to the
.223 cartridge was likely to have been sufficient for the jury to return
the same verdict of guilty. 2°° The Peltier III court admitted reservations
in its conclusion, due both to Judge Benson's ruling that prevented
the defense from bringing up inconsistencies in the ballistics evidence
2" Id. at 779-80. judge Heaney later wrote United States Senator Daniel K. Inouye (n-Ha-
waii), criticizing the role of the FBI and the U.S. government in precipitating the shoot-out and
prosecuting Leonard Peltier.,Joan M. Cheever, Peltier Pardon?, NAT'L 1,1., July 8,1991, at 3. The
letter was eventually forwarded to President Bush. Id. Judge Heaney outlined mitigating circum-
stances that he urged Bush to take into account and recommended favorable action on the
President's part in granting Leonard Peltier a presidential pardon. See id. Specifically, Judge
Heaney's letter said that the "United States government must share the responsibility with Native
Americans for the June 26 firefight," and that the government's role in escalating the conflict
into a firefight should be considered a mitigating circumstance. Id. Furthermore, judge Heaney
was persuaded by the record that more than one person was involved in the shooting of agents
Colo' and Williams, and that the FBI and prosecutors used improper tactics in handling the case.
Id.
205 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 779-80.
2" Id. at 775. Favorableness and materiality of evidence withheld at trial are required under
Brady v. Maryland to warrant a new trial. See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Brady standard. The .223 cartridge was critical to the prosecution's case, because
it pinpointed the Wichita AR-15, linked to Peltier, as the murder weapon, to the exclusion of all
other weapons. Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 772,775.
207 1d. at 777. The court, however, failed to consider the impact of this concealed evidence
on the defense's theory that the FBI had manipulated and fabricated evidence to put Peltier in
jail at all costs. See Id,; see also MATTHIESSEN, supra note I, at 341 (discussion of defense theory).
2" Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 777.
2" Id. at 777-78. Because the evidence led to the inference that the .223 had been loaded
in, but not necessarily fired from, the Wichita AR-I5, the court thought the jury unlikely to have
found that the FBI had manipulated the .223 cartridge, either by altering the lab tests or loading
a different cartridge in the Wichita AR-15 after the fact and using it in the place of the original
one. Id. The court fitiled to recognize that either of these contingencies was supportive of and
supported by the primary defense theory that the FBI had framed Peltier. See id.
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presented to the jury,"° and to the increased likelihood that the jury
would have found that there were multiple AR-15s involved in the
shoot-out. 2"
In sum, after three appeals and the discovery of crucial concealed
evidence, Leonard Peltier was denied a new trial. 212 Peltier was con-
victed primarily on the basis of ballistics evidence linking the Wichita
AR-15 rifle, which witnesses testified he had used at the Pine Ridge
shoot-out, to a .223 cartridge found near the agents' bodies. 2 " The
subsequent discovery of withheld evidence that contradicted the bal-
listics tests and removed the link between Peltier's gun and the casing
was held to be insufficient to warrant a new trial 214 Although the Peltier
III court determined that the concealed evidence was crucial to
Peltier's conviction, the court did not find that the applicable stand-
ards for a new trial were satisfied. 2 l 5
IV TI-I1'. BRADY DOCTRINE'S MISAPPLICATION TO PELTIER
Leonard Peltier's final appeal to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit ("Peltier III") implicated the Brady doc-
trine.216 Peltier sought a new trial pursuant to the Brady and Bagley
decisions, due to the prosecution's withholding of evidence favorable
to the defense."' Specifically, Peltier uncovered documents question-
ing the validity of the crucial piece of evidence in the prosecution's
case, the .223 cartridge.2 ' 6 In Peltier III, the defense argued that the
withholding of this evidence constituted a violation of the Brady doc-
210 Id. at 777. The district court's ruling clearly hampered the defense. Id. at 777 n.8. The
argument foreclosed by this ruling, that the FBI lab may have changed its conclusions concerning
the .223 casing to fit the theory of Peltier's guilt, could have been significant Id.
211 Id. at 779. The jury may have given more serious consideration to the possibility that an
AR-15 other than the one linked to Peltier was used to murder Agents Coler and Williams. Id.
212 See id. at 779-80. Peltier was recently denied another request for a new trial, based on
different grounds. See supra note 13 for a discussion of Peltier v. Henman.
213 Peltier I, 585 F.2d 314, 319 (8th Cir. 1978).
214 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 779-80.
210 Id. at 775,779-80.
216 See id. at 774-75.
217 See Slifira notes 173-215 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Peltier Hand Peltier
III appeals based on suppressed evidence.
218 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 773-74. The evidence, uncovered through the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, called into question the validity of FBI ballistics expert Hodge's test results that had
linked Peltier to the .223 cartridge and therefore to the murders. See Peltier II, 731 F.2d 550,
551-53 (8th Cir. 1984). Specifically, Peltier uncovered an October 2, 1975 FBI teletype asserting
that the Wichita AR-15 attributed to him contained a firing pin different from the one that fired
the .223 cartridge, and documents dated prior to that teletype requesting that the Wichita AR-15
(attributed to Peltier) be tested against the .223 cartridge were also found. Peltier III, 800 F.2d at
776 n.4 (requests for testing .223 cartridge); Peltier II, 731 F.2d at 552-53 (October 2 teletype).
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trine, and that a new trial was warranted under the Bagley test of
materiality. 219
The Peltier III court began its analysis by affirming the contention
that the .223 cartridge was critical to the prosecution's theory that
Peltier had killed the two FBI agents at point-blank range with the
Wichita AR-15.22" The court therefore reasoned that the concealed
evidence, which was damaging to the prosecution's link between
Peltier and the murders, was favorable to the defense, and had it been
disclosed, it would have allowed the defense to cross-examine govern-
ment witnesses more effectively."' The evidence was favorable and
exculpatory, and thus would have warranted a new trial if the court
concluded that the concealed evidence was material under the .Bagley
test.'" The court, however, determined that the concealed evidence
was not material to the outcome of the trial and denied Peltier's
appeal.'"
The Peltier ///court misapplied the Bagley test of materiality to the
concealed evidence. First, the court's assessment of the potential ef-
fects of the withheld evidence on the trial was deficient because the
court ignored the impact of the evidence on the defense's theory of
an FBI frame-up. Second, based on this deficient assessment, the
court's application of the Bagley test was inaccurate and contrary to the
dictates of the Supreme Court.
A. Inadequate Assessment of the Mal Record
In Peltier ill, the court failed to comply with the Supreme Court's
Bagley requirements by inadequately assessing the withheld evidence
in light of the entire trial record.'" The Bagley test allows for a new
trial where material evidence is withheld by the prosecution, and
defines material evidence as that which creates a reasonable probability
2111 800 F.2d at 774.
22° Id. at 775. Tie. court noted that, had the FBI prosecuted Peltier as an alder and abettor,
this evidence would not have been critical to the prosecution's case. Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. Had the Brady Agars, pre-Bagley test been applicable, Peltier probably would have been
granted a new trial. Under the Brady-Agurs test, where the prosecution withholds evidence, a new
trial is warranted where the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist. United Suites v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). In Peltier III, Judge Heaney expressed
discomfort with his decision, because the withheld evidence would have brought up inconsisten-
cies in the ballistics evidence and would have established the presence of multiple AR-15s at the
shoot-out. 800 F.2d at 777, 779.
225
 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 777, 779-80.
221 See SUPTa Holes 204-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Peltier III court's
assessment of the withheld evidence.
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that, had it been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.225
 Reasonable probability is further defined as a prob-
ability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
trial .226 In performing a Bagley analysis, the court is to consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the trial. 227
The Peltier III court failed to assess the totality of the circumstances
of Peltier's trial in determining the impact of the concealed evidence
on the jury. The court assessed the impact of the concealed evidence
on the prosecutor's case, finding that it substantially weakened it. 228
The court, however, ignored the parts of the trial record in which the
defense asserted FBI misconduct. Although the court concluded that
the conflicting ballistics evidence called into question the validity of
the FBI's assertion of Peltier's guilt, the court failed to examine the
defense's argument that the FBI had manipulated and fabricated evi-
dence in an attempt to frame Peltier. 229
The court treated the concealed evidence solely as evidence that
could have been used to impeach ballistics expert Hodge's testimony. 2"
The court noted that the defense had been prevented from bringing
out inconsistencies in the ballistics reports at trial, and that this evi-
dence would have assisted them in doing so. 231 The court did not
evaluate the concealed evidence as exculpatory in nature and failed to
examine it in light of the evidence that the defense had presented.
The concealed evidence, which supported the defense's conten-
don that ballistics expert Hodge had lied on the stand and that a
cover-up was possibly in the works, would have added substantially to
the defense theory in the juror's eyes.232 Specifically, given the other
evidence of FBI misconduct, the withheld evidence would have
strengthened Peltier's theory of an FBI frame-up.'" The jury would
24
 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). See supra notes 149-64 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the Bagley test of materiality.
228 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
221 Id. at 682-83.
228 Peltier III, 800 F,2d 772, 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 207-10 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the impact of the concealed evidence on the prosecutor's case.
229 See Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 775-76. Although the Peltier III court recognized that the
concealed evidence may have demonstrated FBI misconduct in this case, the court failed to
believe that such misconduct actually occurred and therefore ignored this line of analysis in its
reasoning. See id. at 778. Although evidence of FBI misconduct already appeared in the record,
the court refused to believe that the concealed evidence indicated further misconduct and thus
failed to consider how the jury would have weighed this evidence in reaching its verdict. See id.
230 See id. at 777.
231 Id. at 775.
232 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the defense's theory of
an FBI frame-up in Peltier I.
233 See Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 778 (Fill misconduct on the record).
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have attached at least minimal weight to the conflicts in the ballistics
reports and testimony and recognized the possible merit in Peltier's
claim of an FBI frame-up."' The court recognized the existence of
improper conduct by the FBI in this case, but failed to lend credence
to the assertion that the concealed evidence would comprise or indi-
cate further misconduct. 236 The court assumed away the most critical
issue of the case."6
 In other words, the Peltier III court failed to assess
the force with which this evidence would support the defense theory
of a frame-up and ignored any impact of this theory on the jury's
deliberations.
Part of the jury's deliberations necessarily included an assessment
of the defense's theory of an FBI frame-up. If the court had weighed
the concealed evidence in light of the other evidence of FBI miscon-
duct presented at trial, then the defense's case would have been
strengthened and the prosecution's case weakened respectively. Spe-
cifically, had the evidence been available at trial that, prior to October
2, Hodge had received several requests to compare the .223 casing with
the Wichita AR-15, and that on October 2, Hodge had issued a report
stating that the Pine Ridge .223 casings did not match the AR-15, the
logical conclusion would have been that Peltier's gun did not fire the
casing found near the agents' bodies. Furthermore, given the multiple
requests for Hodge to compare the casing to Peltier's gun prior to
October 2, and Hodge's testimony that he never received any requests
to examine the .223 cartridge and that he did not test it until the
beginning of the next year, the inference that the FBI was manipulat-
ing evidence would have been strengthened."' With this argument
made, the defense would have had a solid footing to convince the jury
that the FBI had fabricated its tests demonstrating that the .223 casing
had at some time been loaded into the Wichita AR-15. Given the other
evidence of FBI misconduct on the record, the concealed documents
would have greatly supported the argument of an FBI frame-up and
put doubt into the jury's deliberations that the casing had ever been
254
 See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflicts in ballistics
reports and testimony made apparent by the concealed evidence.
235
 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 778.
230
 The court 'idled to consider the possibility of further FBI misconduct other than that
included in the trial record. See id. This is especially egregious when one realizes that a great deal
of FBI misconduct had been disclosed in the Butler-kobideau trial, See MArritIESSEII, supra note
1, at 290, 294-97, 300-03. It is unclear, but the court may have had the discretion to examine
this case in determining whether thrther FBI misconduct was possible, because the Butler-Ru-
bideau trial was a related case and may be considered part of the totality of circumstances under
Bagley. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1985).
237 See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hodge's conflicting
testimony.
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in the Wichita AR-15. The Peltier III court recognized, as the jury would
have, had the documents been made available, that, given the fact that
the FBI had a personal stake in the outcome of the trial, it may have
falsified the test results. 238 The FBI may have even replaced the original
.223 cartridge found in Coler's trunk with a different one that had
been loaded into the Wichita AR-15 by either Peltier or the FBI.'"
Nevertheless, the court failed to believe that the jury would have
considered this evidence important in its deliberations. 240
B. Misapplication of the Bagley Standard of Materiality
The Peltier III court's inadequate analysis of the effects of the
concealed evidence on the trial record resulted in an inaccurate de-
termination of the materiality of the withheld evidence. 2" Bagley dic-
tates that withheld evidence is material (and a new trial warranted)
where there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed, the results of the trial would have been different. 242 Reason-
able probability is assessed as a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the tria1. 243 The Peltier III court admitted
serious reservations in its holding that there was not a reasonable
probability that the jury would have acquitted Peltier. 244 Thus, the court
expressed doubt in the confidence of the outcome of the tria1. 246 This
lack of confidence is highlighted by opining Judge Heaney's letter to
President Bush, in which he recommended that the President pardon
Leonard Peltier."6 IfJudge Heaney had been convinced that a different
verdict would not have been reached had the withheld evidence been
disclosed, it is doubtful he would have taken such an extreme measure
to assist Peltier.
The court's error stems from its assessment of the impact of the
concealed evidence on the deliberations of the jury and on its appli-
cation of the Bagley test. 247 The court based its opinion that the jury
2S8 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 777-78.
232 Id. at 778.
246 See id.
241 See supra notes 224-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Peltier III court's
inadequate assessment of the impact of the concealed evidence based on the trial record,
242 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
243 Id.
244 Peltier III, 800 F.2d at 777, 779. The court admitted that, had the withheld evidence been
available at trial, it is very likely that the trial court's evidentiary rulings would have heen more
permissive to the defense, allowing it to show inconsistencies in the ballistics evidence. Id. at 777.
245 See id. at 779-80.
246 See Cheerer, supra note 204, at 3.
247 See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Peltier III court's
application of the Bagley test of materiality.
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would still have found Peltier guilty on the existence of additional
evidence in the trial record that the .223 cartridge had been extracted,
but not necessarily fired, from the Wichita AR-15, and that testimony
was given that there was only one AR-15 used in the Pine Ridge
shoot-out. 218 This evidence tended to single out Peltier as the killer. 219
The problem is that both of these pieces of data are intricately affected
by the concealed evidence. First, the October 2 teletype, which stated
that the .223 caliber rifle tested by Hodge contained a firing pin
different from that used at the Pine Ridge shoot-out, is damaging to
the testimony that only one AR-15 was used in the shoot-out. 250 If
Peltier's gun did not fire the casings tested, then there necessarily must
have been at least one other gun present that did. Second, the teletype
in conjunction with Hodge's testimony and the concealed requests for
Hodge to compare the .223 casing with the Wichita AR-15 demonstrate
that not only was the .223 casing included in the October 2 teletype
(and had not been fired from Peltier's gun), but that the FBI was, for
some reason, covering its tracks. Therefore, the concealed evidence
also calls into question the conclusion that the .223 casing had at some
time been loaded into the Wichita AR-15. 25 ' The court failed to ade-
quately assess the impact of the concealed evidence on the jury's
assessment of the government's case against Peltier.
The Peltier III court was correctly concerned with the decision to
deny Peltier a new trial under Bagley. But because the court failed to
adequately address the impact of the concealed evidence on the prose-
cution's case and ignored its impact on the defense's case, it arrived
at the wrong conclusion. Although the court took comfort in the other
evidence linking Peltier to the murders, namely the cartridge exami-
nation and testimony that only one AR-15 was present at the shoot-out,
their acquiescence was ill-founded. 252 Both pieces of evidence become
questionable to the point of nullification when considered in light of
the withheld evidence. The Peltier III court's analysis overlooked the
doubt that this evidence would have cast on the prosecution's theory
that Peltier had fired the fatal shots.
It is more likely than not, given the trial record and the concealed
evidence, that the jury would have acquitted Peltier, for the only evi-
dence linking him to the murders is discredited by the concealed
evidence. Thus, under Bagley, the probability that the jury would have
245 Peltier III, 800 F.2(1 at 777-78.
249 see id.
25° See Peltier 11, 731 14'.2d 550,553 (8th Cir. 1984).
251 See id.
252 See supra notes 208-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Peltier III court's
reliance on other evidence presented at trial.
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returned a different verdict given the withheld evidence is very good.
At least, the probability is sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome of the trial, which is what Bagley dictates. 253 Leonard Peltier
should have been given a new chance to prove his innocence.
V. THE BAGLEY TEST OF MATERIALITY: THE SUBLEGAL SYSTEM
Imprisonment, such as in the case of Leonard Peltier, resulting
from perjured or concealed testimony knowingly used or withheld by
state authorities, is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of
justice and constitutes a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the federal
Constitution. 254 The United States Supreme Court has provided relief
to any citizen convicted on the basis of concealed evidence, allowing
for a new trial where the evidence was exculpatory (or favorable) and
material to guilt (or punishment).255 The standards for determining
the level of materiality necessary to warrant a new trial, however, as
expressed in Bagley, fail to adequately ensure a defendant's due process
rights.258 In fact, in some circumstances, the Bagley test creates a suble-
gal system in which defendants are guilty until they prove their inno-
cence. The Bagley standard of materiality is contrary to the demands
of due process and requires modification to ensure justice.
A. The Sublegal System
When a jury deliberates a criminal case, the jurors attempt to
determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts prove the
defendant's guilt. This rather high standard is necessary to ensure that
the defendant is not deprived of life or liberty without due process of
law. The granting of a new trial, in contrast, tips the scales by requiring
the inverse: namely that, had the evidence been disclosed, it is reason-
ably probable that the jury would not have convicted the defendant. 257
In certain situations, this can result in a destruction of the presumption
of innocence and the imposition of an antithetical sublegal system.
The high standard of materiality under Bagley, a showing of rea-
sonable probability that the jury would have returned a different ver-
dict, presupposes that the trial was fair and accurate. 258 On the basis of
253 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
254 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1941);
Mooney NC Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
255 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
256 See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Bagley test of
materiality.
257 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
258 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
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this presumption, a judge, usually at the appellate level, is required to
speculate on the course the defense would have taken had it obtained
the concealed evidence.'" Judges must necessarily put themselves in
the place of juries and try to determine what the jurors' views would
have been had the evidence been exposed.'" The judge becomes the
jury and assumes the role of a psychic, in an attempt to determine what
the jurors considered important in a trial over which the judge prob-
ably did not preside. The fact that these cases are often decided on
appeal, by a judge far removed from the actual trial, creates an inac-
curate but unavoidable scenario.
The tough standard of materiality in Bagley has more serious
consequences. In both the Peltier and Butler-Robideau trials, a plenti-
tude of evidence existed indicating FBI misdealings in the investigation
and prosecution of the suspects:26' This is understandable, given the
fact that two FBI agents were killed, and their colleagues probably
wanted the murderer to pay for the crime. 262
 The concealment of
critical ballistics documents in Peltier III could very well have been, as
the defense asserted, an attempt on the part of the FBI to convict the
man they thought was guilty. The problem is that, knowing the tough
standards applicable to the granting of retrials if concealed evidence
ever surfaces, the unlikelihood of its surfacing at all, and the lack of
punishment for such concealment, no safeguards exist to prevent the
FBI or any other governmental organization from manipulating the
flow of evidence to obtain a desired conviction. The Bagley standard
of materiality, by making it more difficult to get a new trial, makes it
easier for governmental agencies like the FBI to play judge and jury,
admitting only the evidence they see fit to convict whomever they deem
to be guilty, while the Bagley decision ensures that the victims of this
process will be at a severe disadvantage in trying to regain their free-
dom.
The circumstances surrounding the Pine Ridge murders support
the contention that the FBI concluded early on that Peltier was guilty.
The FBI manipulated, withheld and possibly fabricated evidence in
order to win a conviction.'" The application of the Bagley test com-
259 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683.
26° Brady, 373 U.S. at 88 (quoting Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 171 (Md. 1961)).
261
 See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Butler-Robideau
trial; see supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of FBI misdealings in the
Peltier trial.
222 1n fact, the Pellier III court recognized that the FBI had acted improperly in this case. See
800 F.2d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 1986).
263 See supra notes 178-82, 201-02 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FBI's
conduct regarding the concealed evidence.
932	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:901
pounded Peltier's denial of due process, with the end result being his
imprisonment in Marion and Leavenworth for more than fifteen years.
The effects of Bagley are thus inconsistent with the goals of its prede-
cessor, Brady, where the Supreme Court proclaimed that society wins
not only when the guilty are convicted, but when criminal trials are
fair.'"
The flaws in the Bagley standard are more serious than is at first
evident. Bagley provides no incentive to disclose exculpatory evidence
and no sanctions for its concealment. Thus, in a criminal trial, the
primary safeguard to a defendant's due process is the integrity of the
prosecutor and investigator. In situations where the defendant is con-
sidered a threat, or the prosecutor or investigator has a personal stake
in the outcome of the trial, this is no safeguard at al1. 265
 In such cases,
the likelihood is increased that evidence can and will be successfully
concealed. Once this occurs, and a conviction is won, the defendant
is at a disadvantage in obtaining a new trial. First, the defendant must
be lucky enough to procure the concealed evidence through the Free-
dom of Information Act or some other means. This can take years,
during which time the defendant is serving a sentence improperly
conveyed. Second, Bagley imposes on the defendant a very high stand-
ard of proof to gain a new tria1. 266 Under Bagley, the defendant must
literally prove his innocence to an appellate judge in order to receive
a new tria1. 267 The end result of this process is a second or sublegal
system, in which disfavored defendants are found guilty and impris-
oned without the benefit of a fair trial and then must prove their
innocence to get that new, fair trial.
Using Peltier as an example, the existence and effects of this
sublegal system become apparent. Peltier was investigated and charged
with murder by the FBI, which had a strong personal interest in the
case. Due to the fact that two FBI agents had been killed, and three of
the four suspects had already been exonerated, the FBI had a strong
incentive to withhold and manipulate evidence to ensure that the final
suspect, Peltier, was convicted. The record indicates that the FBI actu-
264
 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
265 See supra note Si and accompanying text for a discussion of the FBI's perception of AIM
activists as a threat to national security.
266 See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the stringent Bagley
standard.
267 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,682 (1985). This results exclusively from Bagley's
standard of materiality requirement that the appellate judge be convinced that it is reasonably
probable, not merely possible or likely, that the result of the trial would have been different had
the evidence been disclosed. Id. Thus, the defendant must convince the judge that in all
probability he would have been acquitted. See id.
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ally did withhold evidence to win Peltier's conviction:26' Once con-
victed, Peltier spent years in prison trying to prove his innocence. After
uncovering the concealed evidence, Peltier, under Bagley, had to con-
vince the appellate court that it was probable that the jury would not
have convicted him had he been given a fair trial, where all pertinent
facts were disclosed. 269
 Thus, Peltier was convicted and imprisoned
without the benefit of a fair trial, and under Bagley, he had to prove
his innocence in order to receive that trial. Peltier III accordingly
demonstrates the inherent injustice of the sublegal system imposed by
Bagley, where defendants can be treated as guilty until proven inno-
cent.
B. A Remedy far the Sublegal System
What can be done to remedy the harsh effects of Bagley? The
debate is one of justice versus judicial expediency. If every convict were
entitled to a new trial after uncovering favorable concealed evidence,
then the criminal justice system would choke on its own backlog.
Under Bagley, however, it is the unfairly convicted that are currently
choking in prison. There must be some middle ground in which justice
and judicial expediency exist in symbiosis. As the Supreme Court stated
in Brady, "[T] he United States wins its point whenever justice is done
its citizens. . ."27" The standard of materiality needs to be reduced in
order to accomplish this.
The appropriate standard would be one that is more consistent
with the standards applicable to the original finding of guilt. Namely,
if a jury is required to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then
concealed evidence would be material and warrant a new trial if it
creates a reasonable doubt as to the outcome of the trial, and not a
reasonable probability that the outcome would, in fact, have been
different. Where a defendant was convicted under the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard, then evidence which could have created that
reasonable doubt should be sufficient to warrant a new trial.
The proposed standard of materiality, which is based on and
consistent with the actual finding of guilt, is not a revolutionary idea.
Rather, it is the same standard that the Supreme Court adopted in
Agars, which was poorly replaced by Bagley nine years later. 27 ' In adopt-
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ing Bagley, the Supreme Court was in search of a flexible standard
applicable to requests for new trials on the basis of concealed evi-
dence.'" This flexible standard has proved ill-conceived and contrary
to the rudimentary demands of justice. The proposed return to the
Agurs test of materiality will more greatly ensure just convictions and
prevent fraudulent imprisonment.
By returning to a standard of materiality consistent with the
finding of guilt, the harsh effects of the sublegal system will be elimi-
nated. First, such a standard will tend to negate the benefits currently
available to any governmental agency that sees fit to render its own
form of justice by withholding evidence and perpetrating a fraud on
the court and the convicted. This will occur due to the reduction of
the benefits associated with the concealment of material evidence,
namely the permanent imposition of conviction and sentence. Second,
where the new standard of materiality failed to prevent the conceal-
ment of material evidence, a convicted defendant will stand a much
greater chance of receiving a new and fair trial. If material evidence
was withheld at the original trial, and that evidence was material in the
sense that it created a reasonable doubt about the conviction, then the
defendant will be granted a new trial without having to prove that the
jury probably would have acquitted him. Thus, even where defendants
are unfairly convicted and functionally treated as guilty without a true
and accurate finding of guilt, they will escape the sublegal system
through a showing that the concealed evidence could have, and not
would have, resulted in a finding of innocence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The extradition, prosecution and affirmations of conviction of
Leonard Peltier demonstrate not only the fundamental injustice pos-
sible in our legal system, but also the failure of the Bagley standard to
correct those faults. Due to stringent standards and the ease with which
crucial evidence may be concealed, Leonard Peltier has become one
of the victims of a sublegal system, where citizens are functionally guilty
until proven innocent. A judicial system that affirms a conviction ob-
272 Se' e473 U.S. at 682. Instead of ignoring whether the withheld evidence had been requested
specifically, generally, or not at all, the Court became concerned with developing a standard that
would cover all possibilities, sometimes at the expense of justice (as demonstrated by Peltier III).
Id. Ideally, the Court should focus its concern on the impact of the evidence on the jury's
deliberations. Although the reason for suppression may be a consideration, justice would be
served best by the Court's focusing on the impact of the facts and not the applicability of a
universal rule.
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tained through the most questionable of means, while the affirming
judge feels compelled to ask the President of the United States to
pardon the convicted, is a system that has failed in its quest for justice.
Only a rejection of the harsh Bagley standard, and a reimposition of
the Agurs test can restore justice to our judicial system. Those convicted
under the standard of "reasonable doubt" should receive a new trial if
the prosecution withholds evidence that would have originally created
that reasonable doubt. The time has come to free those, who like
Leonard Peltier, are convicted on lies and remain imprisoned on
technicalities.
In a recent interview from his cell at Leavenworth, Peltier elo-
quently summed up his situation and his message:
Many people in the U.S. continue to believe their govern-
ment is honest and truthful in its work. It is hard for them to
believe their government is involved in illegal activities—pro-
ducing propaganda, continuing its hundreds of years of geno-
cide, engaging in war against the Indian people and others,
and practicing false imprisonment. People think these things
happen in other countries; they think it can't happen here. 27s
Although he has failed in his attempts to obtain a fair trial, Leonard
Peltier has continued to promote Native American awareness from
his cell in Leavenworth. He has tried, through the courts and the
media, to educate other Native Americans so that they may avoid
his fate.
JOSEPH C. HOGAN III
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